WARNER v. WARNER, 19 A.3d 302 (Del. 2011)

No. 713, 2010.Supreme Court of Delaware.Submitted: April 27, 2011.
Decided: May 6, 2011.

Court Below: Family Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County, File No. CS08-02236, Petition No. 09-14246.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS
and RIDGELY, Justices.

ORDER
JACK B. JACOBS, Justice.

This 6th day of May 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. Jeffrey W. Warner (“Husband”), the petitioner-below, appeals from a Family Court order dividing the marital estate of Husband and the respondent-below, Jasmine Warner (“Wife”). On appeal, Husband claims that the Family Court erroneously applied the martial property division statute, 13 Del. C. § 1513(a), by assigning fifty-five percent of certain marital debts to him, because those debts should have been divided equally between Husband and Wife. We find no merit to Husband’s appeal, and affirm.

2. Husband filed a petition for divorce from Wife after approximately six years of marriage. After granting the parties’ divorce, the Family Court retained ancillary jurisdiction over the case to divide the marital estate. Husband and Wife agreed on the division of certain marital assets, [2] but not of two marital debts that the parties asked the Family Court to divide: (1) a personal loan from a credit union for $4,582.59, and (2) an automobile loan for $14,052.74. Wife asked the Family Court to allocate responsibility for fifty-five percent of those loans to Husband. After conducting a hearing at which both Husband and Wife testified, the Family Court ordered Husband to assume liability for fifty-five percent of the personal and automobile loans.[3] Husband now appeals.

3. Husband claims that by assigning fifty-five percent of the two marital debts to him, the Family Court erroneously applied the martial property division statute, 13 Del. C. § 1513(a). Husband argues that the Family Court “failed to express a rationale for this decision” and “seemingly ignored the application of [] [s]ection 1513. . . .” Specifically, Husband claims that the Family Court failed to consider the following factors: (a) the amount of money Wife would receive from Husband’s pension plan payments; (b) the amount of money Wife had received during the parties’ separation period; (c) the fact that both parties were operating at a monthly deficit; and (d) the fact that the martial debts “were to be divided without attribution.” Had the Family Court properly considered those factors, Husband argues, the martial debts would have been divided equally.

4. We review a Family Court’s decision dividing the martial estate for abuse of discretion.[4] We review conclusions of law de novo, but we will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly wrong and justice requires [them to be] overturn[ed].”[5]

5. The Family Court has broad discretion in dividing the martial estate.[6] Section 1513(a) provides that the Family Court “shall . . . equitably divide, distribute and assign the martial property between the parties. . . .”[7]
“Equitably,” however, is not synonymous with “equally.” Rather, the Family Court must analyze and balance each of the eleven factors enumerated in Section 1513(a).[8] In doing that, the court need not give equal weight to each factor.[9]

6. We conclude that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in allocating fifty-five percent of the disputed martial debts to Husband. In reaching that division, the Family Court considered each of the eleven Section 1513(a) factors and the relevant evidence. The Family Court specifically recognized that: (a) the parties were married for approximately six years; (b) Wife earned approximately $15,000 annually; (c) Husband earned approximately $37,356.80 annually; (d) Wife’s monthly shortfall was approximately $1,311.62, and (e) Husband’s monthly shortfall was between $696 and $834.[10] After balancing those factors and the relevant evidence, the Family Court concluded that Husband should assume fifty-five percent of the personal and automobile loans based on Husband’s higher earning potential and his smaller monthly deficit.[11] That decision was not an abuse of discretion, because it was the product of an orderly and logical reasoning process.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.