STATE v. BLACK, Cr.A. No. PN84-06-0594 (Del.Super. 1999)

State of Delaware v. Dean Cornelius BLACK, DOB 2-22-77, Def. ID No. 84003873DI

Cr. A. Nos. PN84-06-0594, IN84-07-1944Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.Submitted: April 1, 1999
Decided: April 12, 1999 Motion Denied: February 8, 2000

ORDER
GEBELEIN, J.

Upon review of Movant Dean Cornelius Black (“Defendant”)’s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:

(1) Defendant seeks relief from a March 11, 1985 conviction in PN84-06-0594 and from a June 10, 1997 conviction in IN84-07-1944 for violation of probation.[1]

(2) The Delaware Supreme Court has held that in reviewing motions for postconviction relief, this Court must first determine whether a defendant’s claims are procedurally barred prior to considering them on their merits. Because of a procedural bar applicable to PN84-06-0594, this Order addresses IN84-07-1944.[2]

(3) As such, as to IN84-07-1944, Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) requires that Defendant illustrate “a sufficient factual . . . basis for a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2) requires that the content of a postconviction relief motion “set forth in summary form the facts supporting . . . the grounds thus specified.” Accordingly, this Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated.[3]

(4) In the instant Motion, Movant does not provide the Court with any facts or references to the record to substantiate the allegations that he is entitled to postconviction relief for his conviction in IN84-07-1944. The Court, therefore, denies relief upon this ground.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendant Dean C. Black’s Motion for Postconviction relief is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(3) states that a motion “shall be limited to the assertion of a claim for relief against one judgment of conviction. . . . Judgments entered at different times shall not be challenged in one motion but only by separate motions.” It is clear that Defendant’s motion seeks relief from convictions entered at different times.

[2] Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991) Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 747 (1990).

The Court finds that one of Defendant’s claims is procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the 1985 conviction in PN84-06-0594 by mandate on March 28, 1989. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) states that a “motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final.” Because March 28, 1989 is the date on which the judgment of conviction in PN84-06-0594 became final and because more than three years have passed since that date, the motion as it applies to PN84-06-0594 is time barred.

[3] See Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 555 (1990) State v. Conlow, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. IN78-09-0985R1, Herlihy, J. (Oct. 5, 1990) at 5; State v. Gallo, Del. Super., Cr.A. No.. IN87-03-0589-0594, Gebelein, J. (Sept. 2, 1988) at 10.

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