SHORT v. DREWES, 03C-08-026 WCC (Del.Super. 2006)

C.A. No. 03C-08-026 WCC.Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.Submitted: December 28, 2005.
Decided: June 21, 2006.

Upon Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. DENIED.

Kenneth M. Roseman; Ciconte, Roseman Wasserman; Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.

Colin Shalk; Casarino, Christman Shalk; Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CARPENTER, J.

Facts
In March 2002, Robert Short was injured as a result of an automobile accident, that occurred when Thomas Drewes rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a traffic light, causing two additional cars to be rear-ended. Mr. Drewes had consumed alcohol the night of the accident, and upon a breathalyzer test, was considered legally intoxicated and cited for driving under the influence. Among additional damages, Mr. Short sought punitive damages from Mr. Drewes based on his alleged reckless conduct. In December 2005 this Court conducted a two-day trial in the above-captioned case. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury reached a verdict awarding the Plaintiff $47,350.00, which includes $18,750.00 for punitive damages. Thereafter, a renewed motion for directed verdict was appropriately filed by the Defendant, arguing that punitive damages were inappropriately submitted to the jury under the circumstances of the case. The sole question now before this Court is whether the Defendant’s admission by pleading guilty to Reckless Driving, Alcohol Related is sufficient to allow a jury to consider punitive damages when there is no additional evidence of unsafe driving other than the alcohol-related accident. The Court finds it is sufficient, and the motion is hereby denied.

Standard of Review
A Superior Court Criminal Rule 50(b) motion will be granted provided a reasonable jury could only reach a conclusion in favor of the moving party. Further, the Court must determine if it incorrectly ruled or misapplied a legal principle or precedent that in some way would affect the outcome of the trial, and in that instance, the Court will also grant the renewed motion for a directed verdict.[1]

Discussion
Mr. Short sought punitive damages as a result of the accident caused by the alcohol-related reckless conduct committed by Mr. Drewes. Punitive damages are those awarded to either deter or punish the defendant’s conduct, not to make a plaintiff whole.[2] They are civil penalties which require evidence of “egregious conduct of an intentional or reckless nature.”[3] There must be a “conscious indifference to the decision’s foreseeable effect” to warrant such damages, and if there is no evidence submitted to the Court to show the defendant’s conduct meets this standard, it is not an issue for a trier of fact to determine.[4]

At trial, to meet its initial burden relating to punitive damages, and to show the jury that the Defendant acted with the required conscious indifference, the Plaintiff submitted evidence of the outcome of Mr. Drewes’s criminal charges relating to the accident. Thus, the Court and the jury learned that, prior to this trial, Mr. Drewes pled guilty to Following Too Closely[5] and Reckless Driving, Alcohol Related.[6]
To be guilty of Reckless Driving, a defendant must have a “wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property . . .” at the time of the incident.[7]

Wanton conduct was defined by the Supreme Court of Delaware as conduct that “exhibits a conscious indifference to consequences in circumstances where probability of harm to another within the circumference of the conduct is reasonably apparent, although harm to such other is not intended.”[8] More recently, th Jardel court indicates the term “wilful and wanton” is outdated, and “reckless indifference” should now be the preferred language.[9] The court has further made it clear that, regardless of the terminology used, it is the concept of an I-don’t-care attitude that is the crux of willful/wanton or reckless indifferent mentality that is required to allow punitive damages. Thus, the definition of “reckless” used in Jardel to explain what type of action or mental state must be present to warrant punitive damages is strikingly similar to the definition of “wanton” as defined by the Supreme Court and used in the statute Mr. Drewes pled guilty to — conscious indifference to the rights of others.

The Court finds that a plea of Reckless Driving Alcohol Related is sufficient to establish the minimum threshold to allow the issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury. By pleading guilty to Reckless Driving, Mr. Drewes admitted his reckless conduct on the night in question, meaning he admitted to acting with a “conscious indifference to the rights of others,” or with an I-don’t-care attitude with the further additional element of operating his vehicle after the consumption of alcohol.

Ultimately, the question whether defendant’s conduct is sufficient to justify reckless conduct for punitive damages is, and was in this case, left for the jury to decide.[10] The jury was advised that “reckless conduct occurs when a person, with no intent to cause harm, performs an acts so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows or should know that there is an imminent likelihood or harm that can result.”[11] A further instruction advised the jury that punitive damages cannot be awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence.[12] There was no presumption of reckless conduct in the instructions that were given, nor were they instructed that the defendant’s plea established the necessary reckless element to justify punitive award.

The Court is well aware a defendant may enter a plea to a lesser included offense for a number of various reasons. Thus, a defendant may explain to the jury his choice to enter a plea, the advice given to him by counsel, and he may even attempt to discount his presumptive mental state based on the circumstances surrounding the plea. The jury may then draw any inferences from the plea that was entered and any surrounding circumstances, including the defendant’s explanation.[13] Here, however, unfortunately Mr. Drewes was not present at the trial, and therefore did not explain his choice. That was obviously within the discretion of his counsel whether to require Mr. Drewes to be present, but it does not change the evaluation of the initial threshold decision.

The Court is convinced a plea to a criminal statute which requires a clear reckless conduct for it to have been committed, particularly where alcohol is also present, is enough to open the door to punitive damages. And while the plea is not conclusive of the reckless conduct required for an award of punitive damages, it certainly is a strong inference that the jury may take into consideration in deciding whether punitive damages are appropriate.[14] Here, Mr. Drewes did in fact admit to driving recklessly after consuming alcohol, and is the Court’s opinion that alone is enough to allow the question of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury. As such, Mr. Drewes’s motion with respect to punitive damages is hereby denied.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.