No. 77, 2000.Supreme Court of Delaware.
Decided: June 12, 2000
Chancery CA 12055
Affirmed.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
K. KAY SHEARIN, Respondent Below-Appellant, v. MOTHER AUMP CHURCH, MORRIS A. COMEGYS, and SARA B. GARDNER, Petitioners Below-Appellees. No. 77, 2000. In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: May 1, 2000 Decided: June 12, 2000
Court Below — Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 12055.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and HARTNETT, Justices.
ORDER
This 12th day of June 2000, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellees’ motion to affirm, and the appellant’s response thereto,[1] it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, K. Kay Shearin, pro se, filed this appeal from the Court of Chancery’s denial of her motion to dismiss the action below and vacate all previous opinions and orders issued in the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Shearin contended that the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction to determine title to real property. The Court of Chancery denied Shearin’s motion on the ground that it lacked “any colorable basis and border[ed] on the frivolous.” The appellees have filed a motion to affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery. Supr. Ct. 25(a). We find that: (a) Shearin lacks standing to bring this appeal; (b) the appeal is barred by res judicata; and (c) there is no merit to the substance of Shearin’s claim. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery.
(2) The record reflects that the plaintiffs-appellees, the Mother AUMP Church, Morris A. Comegys, and Sara B. Gardner (collectively “the plaintiffs”), initially filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery in 1991 seeking injunctive relief against the Conference of the African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church (“the Conference”) and Delbert L. Jackson (collectively, “the defendants”).[2] The plaintiffs, in essence, sought to enjoin the defendants, who were represented by Shearin,[3] from interfering with their right to the quiet title, operation, use, enjoyment, and governance of certain real property. After granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the defendants, the Court of Chancery issued its Superseding Final Order and Judgment on February 23, 1993.[4] That order, among other things, permanently enjoined the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs’ right to the property.
(3) The Court of Chancery’s February 23, 1993 order also found Shearin, as defendants’ counsel, to be in violation of Chancery Court Rule 11 and ordered her to pay $459 in counsel fees as a sanction for her Rule 11 violation. Although named as a respondent in several contempt proceedings relating to her misconduct as a lawyer in this case, Shearin has never been a party to the underlying substantive proceedings.[5]
(4) In December 1999, over six years after the permanent injunction issued in this case, Shearin, on her own behalf, filed a motion to dismiss the case and to vacate all previous orders and judgments. The Court of Chancery summarily denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.
(5) We find it manifest on the face of Shearin’s opening brief that the judgment of the Court of Chancery must be affirmed. First, Shearin was never a party to the substantive proceedings before the Court of Chancery. Accordingly, she lacks standing to maintain the present appeal.[6] Second, although subject matter jurisdiction usually may be raised at any time prior to final judgment, the general rule is that “a final judgment has res judicata effect in a subsequent proceeding, and a collateral attack based on the want of subject matter jurisdiction is barred.”[7] Finally, Shearin’s substantive claim that the Court of Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction is frivolous. When determining whether there is equitable jurisdiction, the Court of Chancery must look at the face of the complaint as of the time of filing.[8] In this case, the plaintiffs’ complaint sought injunctive relief, which is within the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.[9]
(6) We find it manifest on the face of the opening brief that Shearin’s appeal is without merit. This vexatious litigation must end. Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is directed that no future appeals filed by Shearin in this case shall be docketed unless first reviewed and approved for filing by a Justice of this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of Chancery is hereby AFFIRMED.