Bayard’s Notebook, 168
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware, Kent County.
November, 1796.
Page 418
The petitioner claimed her freedom on the ground that her grandmother, who was imported into this country was a native of Asia. It appeared that her grandmother was an Asiatic, but that she and the mother of petitioner had been held as slaves, and that her father was a Negro.
Ridgely and Bayard contended for the petitioner that none but Negroes and their descendants could be slaves in this state. That law or usage went no further, and that the court could not be disposed to extend the limits of slavery beyond its ancient bounds. That if Asiatics could be slaves, so might Europeans, and that the evil would be much increased by such an extension of the principle of slavery.
Upon the other side it was insisted by Vining and Miller
that slavery did’ not grow out of any positive law of the state and, of consequence, in its origin was not limited as to its object by any precise rules. That the general principle being admitted that slaves might be held under the laws of the state, the only question which could remain was whether a person imported was a slave; and that there was nothing to prevent slaves being acquired in Asia as well as in Africa. There certainly were slaves in Asia, and if a title to an Asiatic slave were fairly acquired, the law of the state did not forbid the holding such a person as a slave. There could be no reason for allowing Africans to be slaves and preventing as to the people of other quarters of the world. The violation of right, the immorality and inconvenience were as great in one case as in the other. That the grandmother and mother of the petitioner had been actually held as slaves, which carries with it some evidence that slavery was not confined as contended on the other side.
The Court having taken time to consider the case, the CHIEF JUSTICE delivered their opinion. BASSETT, C. J. The Court are clearly of opinion that the petitioner is entitled to her freedom. Slavery in this state does not extend, nor has it ever been held to extend, to other persons than Negroes and mulattoes descended from a female Negro. There is no law which recognizes slaves of any other description, nor any custom which has allowed others to be held in slavery. The law would warrant us to say that a Negro or mulatto might be a slave, but we know of no authority which would justify us in expressing the same opinion as to any other description of people. It cannot be expected that at this day we should extend the principle of slavery beyond the limits of positive law or usage clearly and certainly ascertained. In this case there is no such law or usage. I know a decision
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similar to the opinion we have delivered was once made in the Court of Appeals in Maryland. The case was much contested, and three hundred persons held in slavery were discharged by the determination of the court.
The petitioner [was] decreed free.