No. 91, 1999.Supreme Court of Delaware.
August 18, 1999.
Appeal from the Superior Court, New Castle County, CrA IN89-08-1560, IN89-08-1562.
AFFIRMED
Unpublished Opinion is below.
GREGORY JOHNSON, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 91, 1999. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: July 27, 1999. Decided: August 18, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr.A. No. IN89-08-1560, IN89-08-1562.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH andHOLLAND, Justices
ORDER
This 18th day of August, 1999, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Gregory Johnson (“Johnson”), filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.
(2) Johnson pleaded guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree and Assault Second Degree and was sentenced by the Superior Court for those crimes. The sentencing order did not include a provision for restitution.
(3) After Johnson’s sentencing, the victim of Johnson’s crimes filed a claim for restitution with the Violent Crimes Compensation Board (the “Board”). Johnson responded to the Board and agreed to the payment of restitution on a monthly basis. The Board then wrote to the Superior Court and requested that it consider amending its order of sentencing to include a provision for restitution. The Superior Court so amended its sentencing order.
(4) Johnson then appealed from the amended sentencing order on the basis that he had not agreed to pay restitution as ordered by the Superior Court. On July 8, 1997, this Court ordered that the Superior Court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Johnson had agreed to pay restitution and, if so, whether he agreed to pay the amount ordered on the terms contained in the amended sentencing order.[1]
(5) On remand, the Superior Court vacated the amended sentencing order and reinstated its original sentencing order, which did not require Johnson to make restitution, rendering a hearing on the issue of restitution unnecessary.
(6) Following communication from both counsel in this matter, this Court directed that a stipulation of dismissal be filed. Johnson, however, filed a pro se notice of appeal. This Court then ordered the appeal dismissed on the basis of mootness.[2]
(7) Johnson now requests postconviction relief on the grounds that his guilty plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily because he was not informed that restitution could be ordered and because the Superior Court’s amended sentencing order undermined the plea agreement and invalidated the guilty plea. Johnson also claims that the amended sentencing order subjected him to double jeopardy.
(8) When reviewing a motion under Rule 61, this Court first must determine that the motion satisfies the procedural requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues.[3] Rule 61(i)(4) prohibits claims that have already been adjudicated. Here, Johnson’s claim that the amended sentencing order violated his constitutional rights was already adjudicated in this Court’s Order dated September 11, 1997. There, this Court noted that the only issues raised by Johnson on his appeal related to restitution. The Court held that the issue of restitution had been rendered moot by the Superior Court’s reinstatement of its original sentencing order. The issues now raised by Johnson are virtually identical. The Superior Court, therefore, properly dismissed Johnson’s motion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
Joseph T. Walsh Justice