CHAPMAN v. STATE, 791 A.2d 750 (Del. 2002)

No. 311, 2000Supreme Court of Delaware.
Decided: February 13, 2002

Court Below — Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County Cr.A. Nos. IK99050501 through IK99050515

Affirmed.

Unpublished opinion is below.

WARREN H. CHAPMAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 311, 2000 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: January 29, 2002 Decided: February 13, 2002

Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.

Randy J. Holland, Justice:

ORDER
This 13th day of February 2002, it appears to the Court that:

1) The defendant-appellant, Warren H. Chapman, was indicted on six counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, two counts of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, one count of Rape in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, four counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Chapman was convicted of all charges. On May 31, 2000, he was sentenced to 139 years of incarceration at Level V, plus a life sentence, 155 years are minimum mandatory time.

2) In his direct appeal, Chapman claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying his pretrial motion to suppress statements that he made to the Delaware State Police on May 20, 1999. He argues that two statements made to the police during separate custodial interrogations at State Police Troop 3 violated his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona.[1] Chapman further argues that statements he made en route from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Delaware Department of Corrections were taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We have concluded that both of Chapman’s arguments are without merit.

3) Chapman’s first argument is that statements to the Delaware State Police during two custodial interrogations were taken without a valid waiver of his Miranda rights because any waiver that he gave was not made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Following a suppression hearing on December 20, 1999, the Superior Court ruled, that in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogations, Chapman was advised of his Miranda rights and had voluntarily waived those rights. We conclude that the Superior Court properly denied Chapman’s motion to suppress those statements. We affirm the Superior Court’s decision denying Chapman’s Fifth Amendment claim on the basis of its December 29, 1999 ruling and January 28, 2000 order.

4) Chapman next argues that his statement given to Detective Bowers en route from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Delaware Department of Corrections was a post-presentment statement that was taken without a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Since Chapman never raised this issue in the Superior Court, the applicable standard of appellate review is plain error.[2]

5) Chapman’s statement made en route to the Delaware Department of Corrections occurred following presentment to a magistrate and after formal legal proceedings were initiated against him. The State correctly acknowledges that Chapman’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied once Chapman had been presented to a committing magistrate.[3] The State, however, argues that any violation of Chapman’s Sixth Amendment right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State asserts that the statement, in the context of all of the evidence presented, would not have affected the outcome of the trial.

6) The State’s case against Chapman was very strong. In addition to Chapman’s confession, the State presented direct testimony from the victim supported by corroborating evidence. Consequently, although Chapman’s statement en route to the prison was taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the admission of that statement into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.[4]

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED.